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WHERE HAVE ALL THE DIRECTORS GONE:
CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY AND
COPING WITH THE INSURANCE CRISIS
Tn the United States, as in other countries, senior corporate managers
.have long anticipated the day when they would occupy a seat on the
board of their own or some other company, a prestigious reward for a
successful career. Senior executives are increasingly reluctant to accept
this once desirous position since they are finding that their personal
assets could be seriously at risk following their election to a corporate
board.
There are two overlapping reasons for this alarming development.
First, directors and officers insurance may be either unavailable or
unaffordable, and second, disgruntled shareholders and employees are
increasingly apt to second-guess boardroom decisions in the courts. These
two problems have begun to affect the traditional boardroom style of
operations of many American corporations.1
In recent years, the number of legal actions brought against directors
and officers of both private and public corporations has increased dra-
matically. In 1985, there were more than 500 claims of $1 million or more
against directors compared with only two fifteen years ago. 2 In the last
two years alone, there have been at least ten court settlements of $20
million or more, including a $110 million settlement against five former
directors and officers of the bank holding company Seafirst Corporation. 3
With the exception of directors of financial institutions, less than half of
one percent of all directors sued are the subject of an adverse judgment.4
However, adverse or not, the director or officer is still faced with an
average of six years of litigation with the average cost to defend the
action at $470,000. 5 It is the cost of defending against these claims that
directors and officers are worried about. The cost of defense is the issue,
' Harris, Corporate Directors Run for Cover, MGmT. TODAY, Apr. 1987, at 19. Dudley,
D&O Alternatives Discussed at RIMS, NAT'L. UNDERWRITERS: PROP. AND CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE
BENEFrrs EDMON, May 18, 1987, at 66.
2 Verespej, Boardroom Roulette. Who's Ready to Risk His Personal Wealth to Sit on a
Corporate Board, INDUSTRY WEEK, Aug. 10, 1987, at 47.
' Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Seafirst Corp., No. C85-3962R (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 19, 1980).
4 Verespej, supra note 2, at 47.
5 Id.
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not the question of guilt.6 Not surprisingly, corporate directors are
becoming uneasy about putting their personal wealth at risk for a job
fraught with potential liability, and a salary that fails to match the risk.7
As a result, many outside directors are declining to serve on a board
unless the corporation will provide them with adequate protection from
the risk of personal liability.8 The traditional protection provided by
corporations in past years has been director and officer liability insur-
ance. However, as a result of a recent rash of litigation brought under
such policies, as well as large losses incurred by liability insurers in other
lines of business, insurers have been prompted to either cease writing
director and officer coverage or to provide such coverage at greatly
inflated premiums with an increased number of exclusions. 9 Director and
officer liability insurance premiums increased an average of 506% in
1986 and the three-year policy has disappeared, being replaced by a
one-year policy.1o The standard policy provides exclusions for proxy
fights, takeover battles, claims by one director against another, public
offerings, fraud, environmental changes, and lawsuits by a corporation
against its directors." The larger industrial corporations should have the
financial resources to cope with the increased insurance costs and provide
their directors and officers with adequate protection. However, smaller
firms and emerging companies that are experiencing rapid growth and
the need for outside director guidance will have the greatest degree of
difficulty coping with the insurance crisis. Several Cleveland director and
officer liability insurance brokers stated that directors and officers
involved in small corporations, condominium developments or charitable
corporations (typically low asset corporations) will find it difficult if not
impossible to secure insurance coverage. 12 The insurance companies are
looking to the financial stability of a company before providing any
coverage. Corporations with minimal assets will be without the financial
basis needed to secure insurance to protect their directors and officers.
Although the market for director and officer insurance seems to have
stabilized during 1987 as a result of corporate and legislative response to
6 Id. at 48.
7 Id. at 47.
8 Goldwasser, An Overview of Director's and Officer's Liability Insurance, DIRECTOR'S AND
OFFICER'S LIABILITY INS. AND SELF INS. 12-23 (Commercial Law and Practice, Course Handbook
Series, Number 381, (1986)).
9 Id.
' Kettrell, D & 0 Premiums up 506%, POLL Bus. WEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 3.
11 Id. Verespej, supra note 2, at 47. Mulcany, Directors Quit in Wake of Huge D&O Rise,
NAT'L UNDERWRITERS: PROP. & CASUALTY/INS. EDITION, Feb. 14, 1986, at 12.
" Telephone interview with Brooks & Stafford Co., Cleveland, Ohio (12/87). Telephone
interview with Alexander & Alexander, Co., Cleveland, Ohio (12/87).
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the impact of the insurance crisis, it remains an unstable and unreliable
basis for director and officer protection.
As a general rule, the best way to cope with the change in the business
environment and the insurance crisis is to plan in advance for it. Through
careful corporate structuring and planning, while remaining flexible, a
small company can maximize their protection from liability. The factors
to consider range from a careful drafting of the corporate articles and
bylaws to the creation of captive insurance companies.
Before delving into the means to supplement director and officer
liability insurance, a brief discussion of the cause for the instability
would be proper. In Smith v. Van Gorkom,13 the Supreme Court of
Delaware, the state that was traditionally known for its pro-corporation
posture, set a trend for expanding the scope of the directors' duties and
responsibilities. In Van Gorkom, the board of directors of Trans Union
Corporation were held individually liable for a judgment of $13.5 million
in excess of the Company's director and officer policy. 14
The court found that the directors breached their duty of care in
approving a proposed cash merger of fifty-five dollars per share even
though the price represented a forty-eight percent premium over the
stock's last closing prior to the offer, and a thirty-nine percent premium
over the highest price in the six month period preceding the offer. The
court ruled the fifty-five dollars per share amount was considerably below
the "intrinsic value" of the stock. The court found the board grossly
negligent for hastily acting without reviewing the proposed merger
agreement or obtaining documentary support adequately calculating the
price and, as a result, were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the
company. 15 The fact that this was done within a two-hour period without
prior notice to the shareholders and the absence of an emergency
supported the court's holding. The court did not care that the price was so
much more than the market price, that the directors acted on legal advice
that no independent opinion was needed, or that the directors were
advised they would be sued if the offer was rejected. It did not care about
the board's experience, and disregarded the legal presumption that
directors act in good faith. All these factors cited were found irrelevant in
determining the threshold issue of whether the directors as a board
exercised an informed business judgment.16 Consequently, the directors
were found liable for breach of the duty of care. Van Gorkom set in motion
a trend of increased exposure for directors and officers of American
corporations. 17
13 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
14 Id. at 891.
15 Id. at 876.
16 Id. at 889.
'" Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. Sealy Inc., 532 A.2d 1324 (Del. 1987); A.C. Aquisitions
1988]
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Means of Supplementing Director & Officer Liability Insurance
The first way to combat the increased exposure to corporate directors
and officers is the formation of a captive insurance company or insurance
pooling.' A captive insurance company is one owned exclusively by the
group for whom coverage is provided. The theory is that a corporation can
provide less expensive coverage if it owns and controls the insurer. A
primary benefit of a captive is the assurance of the availability of
insurance to the corporation coupled with the reduced possibility of an
availability crisis in the future. A captive has the benefit of knowing its
own losses and being able to share the loss history with its insureds to
justify premiums. Many commercial carriers do not share this informa-
tion. Consequently, insured parties often suspect commercial insurance
of looking for a windfall. Captives may also be able to provide better
claims service than commercial carriers because of greater knowledge
about their market.
The major disadvantage is cost. Premiums of a captive will generally be
higher than those of a commercial carrier because it must charge
premiums sufficient to provide for a strong, well-capitalized company
which can pay the losses of the insured. The problem of high premiums is
intensified by the categorization of the captive. They are not purely
self-insurance nor are they insurance in the sense that laymen think of
insurance purchased from an independent company. A captive resembles
more closely an incorporated self-insurance reserve. The IRS has taken
the position that premiums paid to a captive are not deductible. Further,
captives are in the precarious position of being a single line insurance
company. With only one line of insurance, a captive cannot offset losses
of director and officer liability coverage by profits in another type of
insurance. One large loss or series of losses can be devastating to a
captive. Captives must have strict underwriting standards to eliminate
these unacceptable risks.
Despite the disadvantages, where captives are permitted, their forma-
tion may be an attractive long term solution. In fact, the current crisis
situation may afford the opportunity for corporations to form captives
because the fear of continued high premiums compared to liability
exposure may provide the incentive for corporate groups to act. 19 This
statement must, however, be hedged because of the stabilization of the
insurance market during this year. The large initial capital outlay and
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 803 (Del. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holding; 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985); Alford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986).
Is See Rowner, Banks Win Approval to Form Captive for Insurance, LEGAL TIMES, March 3,
1986, at 1, col. 3.
" Grove and Tuuk, Self Insurance: Is a Captive the Answer?, 65 MICH. BAR J. 556 (June
1986).
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high premiums must be weighed against the possible realignment of the
insurance market in the near future.
The second factor to be considered is a careful selection of the
corporation's state of incorporation. Although Delaware was the first
state to pass legislative relief for director liability woes, the laws of that
state do not provide the degree of protection to corporate directors and
officers that the laws of Ohio and Indiana do.20 While the Delaware law
permits companies to amend their charters to protect directors from
lawsuits that allege a breach of duty of care, it still leaves them liable for
breaches of duty of loyalty as well as decisions not made in good faith.
That makes directors particularly vulnerable to lawsuits that arise from
hostile takeover battles. Under Delaware law, directors are placed in an
inherent conflict of interest in takeover attempts. They have a duty to the
shareholders to maximize the value of the company, a duty to evaluate the
long term impact of the bid, and on top of that an inherent self-interest.
So no matter what is done, chances are one of those duties will be
breached.
In March of 1986, the Indiana General Assembly altered the liability
rule in duty of care cases from a negligence standard to a willful
misconduct or recklessness standard.21 The Ohio law goes one step
further. It states that directors are liable for monetary damages only if it
is proved by clear and convincing evidence that a director deliberately
intended to cause injury or recklessly disregarded the best interests of the
corporation. 22 The statute also states that a director is not subject to a
higher duty of care in takeovers. 23 That leaves directors in Ohio and
Indiana financially liable only for reckless actions, unlawful payments
and dividends, fraud, greenmail, illegal use of inside information, and
violation of federal laws. As a result, the majority of board-type decisions
are excluded from liability.24 This creates a much more acceptable
standard from which liability can be found against directors and officers.
This added protection provided by Indiana and Ohio may help corpora-
tions within their jurisdictions to retain and obtain outside directors. The
advantage that the careful selection of the state of incorporation offers in
addition to the other considerations set forth in this Article, is that it
must be done with shareholder approval. The effect is to minimize
actionable objections by shareholders which might give rise to litigation,
while at the same time provide maximum director and officer protection.
The next consideration in limiting the liability of directors and officers
is properly drafted articles of incorporation and bylaws. In June of 1986,
o Verespej, Lawsuit Troubles Still Hound Directors, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 1, 1987, at 15.
21 IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2)(Burns Supp. 1986).
22 Oro REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
23 Id.
24 Verespej, supra note 20, at 15.
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the Delaware Legislature enacted legislation which enables a corporation
to adopt a provision in its articles of incorporation which would limit or
eliminate the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty.28 Sev-
enteen states have currently adopted this type of legislation26 and Ohio
has drafted a similar statute, but has not legislatively adopted the
provision.27
The Delaware statute applies only when a director violates his duty of
care. Therefore, the extent of protection depends on the breadth of the
definition of the duty of care. When a director acts in a negligent or
grossly negligent manner, but in good faith, his action is treated as a
breach of the duty of care, and the new statute will enable a corporation
to prevent the director from incurring any personal monetary liability.
But, if the director acts in a grossly negligent manner, and in conscious
disregard of a known risk, or in a reckless manner, then such action may
be viewed as taken in bad faith. The Delaware statute will not protect a
director who has acted in bad faith from incurring monetary liability.
28
Whether the new legislation protects the director from liability for
reckless action taken in good faith remains uncertain and must wait
further judicial interpretation of the statute.2 9
If the court decides to enlarge the scope of the duty of loyalty, then the
extent of protection available under the Delaware statute must be
reconsidered. The business judgment rule3o already protects directors
from liability for mere negligence in most cases. A court, however, could
hold that all grossly negligent behavior is per se in bad faith and thus a
violation of the duty of loyalty. Alternatively, a court could view such
behavior as reckless behavior that breaches the duty of loyalty. Should
the courts choose to expand the scope of the duty of loyalty in either of
these ways, the Delaware statute may be so circumscribed that it would
in effect provide only very limited additional protection to directors.31
The Delaware statute is a product of the marketplace. It is a definite
legislative response to Van Gorkom. Its clear intent is to afford directors
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(Supp. 1986).
26 King, Director Protection Under Virignia Law, 20 THE REVIEW OF SECURITIES AND
COMMODIiEs REGULATION, 129 (Aug. 1987).
27 Schaffer, Delaware's Limit on Director Liability & How the Market for Incorporation
Shapes Corporate Law. 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB.PoL'Y 665, 687 (1987).
28 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(Supp., 1986).
2 Schaffer, supra note 27, at 668.
o This rule immunizes management from liability in corporate transactions under-
taken within both power of corporation and authority of management where there is
reasonable basis to indicate that transaction was made in good faith. Nursing Home Bldg.
Corp. v. DeHart, 13 Wash. App. 489, 535 P.2d 137 (1975). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed.
1979).
31 Schaffer, supra note 27, at 669.
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of corporations broader protection from suits initiated by corporations
and shareholders, draw qualified people onto the board as well as attempt
to allow Delaware to remain the nation's leading corporate domicile. The
advantage of such a statute is to broaden the safety net for directors in
the current environment of hostile takeovers.
Many suits against directors are instituted by shareholders and em-
ployees of the corporation in the wake of mergers and acquisitions in an
attempt to second guess the directors decision.32 By providing for protec-
tion in this area of litigation, directors will realize a needed buffer zone
to properly exercise their discretionary power within the corporation. The
marketplace response to Delaware's statute appears favorable. In the six
months following the enactment of the statute, Delaware increased the
number of new incorporations by twenty-eight percent.33 Whether the
intended enhanced protection will materialize must be determined after
future judicial application of the statute.
As previously stated, Ohio has drafted but not enacted a statute similar
to Delaware's statute. 34 However, issues are raised as to whether Ohio
needs such a statute under its current corporate law scheme. Ohio may
enact the statute in order to achieve continued growth in the number of
incorporations within its boundaries, and compete with other states for a
large corporate base.
Under the Delaware statute, a director's liability for monetary dam-
ages may not be limited or eliminated for any breach of the director's duty
of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; for acts or omissions not
in good faith or which involve international misconduct or a knowing
violation of law under section 174 of this title; or for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit.35
Under the Ohio statute,3 6 the director of a corporation would not be
liable in monetary damages for a breach of fiduciary duties unless the act
or omission was undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the
corporation, and undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interest
of the corporation.37 The Ohio statute clearly provides a larger degree of
protection for the director of a corporation than does the Delaware
statute. Another advantageous feature of the Ohio statute is that
protection will be provided unless expressly refuted in the corporate
articles or bylaws. 38 The Delaware statute requires an express inclusion
within the corporate articles. In order to amend the articles to provide
32 See supra note 1.
33 Shaffer, supra note 27, at 688.
34 Id. at 687.
35 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(Supp. 1987).
36 OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
37 Id.
38 Id.
19881
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directors with protection from personal liability, the shareholders must
approve the amendment.39 In the situation of a controlled corporation, a
controlling shareholder who sits on the board may be faced with a conflict
of interest and fall within exclusion of the statute and be exposed to
monetary damages with personal liability. It is also noteworthy that the
Delaware statute requires the clause to be in the articles of incorporation,
and therefore, a matter of public record. The Ohio statute allows the
corporation to elect from the statutory protection in its bylaws, an
in-house document, not subject to public review. It should also be noted
that both statutory models protect directors from certain monetary
damage award, but not from equitable remedies. 40 This gives rise to the
issue of the expense of defending actions previously discussed along with
the choice of incorporation state.
The fourth factor to consider is the adoption of a clause in the corporate
articles or bylaws providing for indemnification rights for the directors
and officers of the corporation. Currently, all fifty states provide for
indemnification of directors and officers for liabilities arising out of
services to the corporation. 4 ' A broad right of indemnification is neces-
sary, it is believed, to protect corporate directors and officers from
unjustified suits and claims, and to promote their security by the
knowledge that their reasonable expenses will be borne by the corpora-
tion they have served if they are vindicated. Beyond that, its larger
purpose is "to encourage capable men to serve as corporate directors,
secure in the knowledge that expenses incurred by them in upholding
their honesty and integrity as directors will be borne by the corporation
they serve." 4
2
This broad right of indemnification is limited by the policy that
indemnification will be permitted only where it furthers accepted corpo-
rate goals and does not provide protection or encourage wrongful or
improper conduct. 43 As a result of these limitations on indemnification,
many corporate officials have a grossly exaggerated assumption of the
protection the statutes provide. The right to indemnification is statutorily
divided into two types: mandatory and permissive indemnification.
Under the Ohio44 and Delaware45 statutes, which represent the major-
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(Supp. 1986).
4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7)(Supp. 1986).
4' Block, Barton & Radin, Indemnification and Insurance of Corporate Officials, 13 SEC.
REG. L. J. 239 (1985).
42 Id. at 239. See, e.g., Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 898 (3d
Cir. 1953); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 343-44 (Del. Super. Ct.
1983)(quoting E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 98 (1972); Essential Enters.
Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 38 Del. 371, 164 A.2d 437, 441-42 (1960).
41 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT, Official comment at 412-13 (1984 ed.).
44 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(3)(Baldwin Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 36:575
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss4/15
1988] WHERE HAVE ALL THE DIRECTORS GONE 583
ity of state laws, indemnification is mandatory where the person to be
indemnified has been successful on the merits or otherwise. 46 The "on the
merits or otherwise" formulation recognizes that even where the defen-
dant has done something that violates his fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion, they may be entitled to indemnification because of procedural
defenses not related to the merits. The policy for these formulations is
that it is unreasonable to require a defendant with a valid procedural
defense to undergo the trial on the merits and the expense of defending
the claims in order to establish eligibility for mandatory indemnification.
California law, however, requires the director to be successful "on the
merits" to appreciate mandatory indemnification. 47
Where indemnification is not mandatory, Ohio4 s and Delaware 49 stat-
utes provide for permissive indemnification of corporate officials where
the requisite standard of care is met. 50 Most statutes have separate but
similarly worded statutes for indemnification in third-party actions as
compared to actions brought by or in the right of the corporation. These
standards define the outer limits for which permissive indemnification is
permitted, however, directors are not per se entitled to indemnification to
these limits.51 Corporations may adopt bylaws obligating the corporation
to indemnify directors to a lesser extent than permitted by the statute.
Most state statutes, including Ohio and Delaware, provide that indem-
nification may be granted in third-party actions if the director or officer
involved acted in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believed to be in
or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and with respect to
a criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful.52
Unlike the cases in derivative actions, most statutes authorize indem-
nification of judgments, fines, penalties, amounts paid in settlement, and
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, in third-party actions. 53
The termination of an action by judgment, order, settlement, conviction,
or plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent does not by itself create a
presumption that the standard of conduct required for indemnification
has not been satisfied. The determination of the propriety of allowing
indemnity in these situations will be discussed below.
As noted above, most states utilize similarly worded standards to
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d)(Supp. 1986).
46 Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 241.
47 id. at 242.
41 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(1) and (2) (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
4' DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)(b)(Supp. 1986).
" Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 242.
51 Id.
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(1)(Baldwin Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(a)(Supp. 1986).
53 Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 245.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
permit indemnification of corporate officials in both third-party actions
and derivative actions. 54 Most states, however, preclude indemnification
where the party is adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in
the performance of their duty to the corporation unless and only to the
extent the presiding court permits. In addition, judgments and amounts
paid in settling or otherwise disposing of a derivative action are generally
not subject to indemnification.5 5 This rule is intended to avoid the
circularity that would result if funds received by the corporation were
simply returned to the persons who paid them. 56 Permissive indemnifi-
cation must be authorized on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, a deter-
mination must be made that indemnification is proper under the circum-
stances because the person to be indemnified has met the applicable
standards of conduct. This determination typically may be made by the
board of directors, special counsel, or shareholders. A board decision must
be by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who are not
parties to the proceeding. 57 Independent or special legal counsel chosen
by a majority vote of nonparty directors is permitted by most states to
render an opinion authorizing indemnification where the board of direc-
tors does not have the requisite number of nondefendant directors. 58
Ohio and Delaware, like most states, permit the corporation to advance
defense costs to the corporate official subjected to litigation, upon receipt
of an undertaking by or on behalf of the director to repay such amount if
it is determined that he is not entitled to indemnification by the
corporation. 59 Most statutory indemnification provisions are not exclu-
sive, that is, they do not prohibit indemnification in situations beyond the
boundaries explicitly authorized by the statute.60 For example, Section
145(e) of the Delaware statute states:
The indemnification provided by this [statute] shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking
indemnification may be entitled under by-law agreement, vote of
stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to
action in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity
while holding such office .... 61
54 Id. at 244. Block, Barton & Garfield, Advising Directors the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14
SEc. REo. L. J. 130 (1986).
" Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 239.
56 Id. at 244.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(4)(Baldwin Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(d)(Supp. 1986). Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 245.
F8 Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 245.
'S OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(b)(Baldwin Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(e)(Supp. 1986).
60 Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 248.
61 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e)(Supp. 1986).
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Notwithstanding the breadth of nonexclusivity provisions, the few cases
in which the issue has been presented suggest that courts will either
ignore such provisions or read them restrictively.62
In addition to the false sense of security the existence of indemnifica-
tion clauses create because the corporate official is not aware of its
limitations, indemnification is only as good as the financial assets of the
corporation. 63 If a firm goes bankrupt, all the indemnification in the
world will not help a director facing a liability suit. As previously stated,
much of the current litigation arises from corporate mergers and acqui-
sitions. In the wake of hostile takeover, a director who opposes the
takeover and is removed from his office as a result of the takeover, may
be subjected to litigation that falls within the area of permissive
indemnification. In these situations, it is fair to assume the new board
will not authorize indemnification of the outside corporate official,
leaving that person without protection. Another problem often recognized
with indemnification is that it creates a potential liability for the
corporation because it shifts the risk from outside the entity to inside the
corporation and uses corporate assets to protect the directors.6 4
In the wake of Van Gorkom and so many suits resulting from activities
involving corporate takeovers, management strategies making the cor-
poration less of a target should be in place well before the takeover is
imminent. Anti-takeover devices adopted after the takeover attempt has
begun may not be in the best interest of shareholders. Strategies making
the corporation less of a target should be in place early in the existence
of a growing company.65 A well drafted set of articles and bylaws will
allow the corporate directors to be prepared for a takeover attempt
instead of surprised and scrambling for protection. The corporate officers
should have an effective strategy in place to avoid mistakes that can lead
to claims against the corporation. One such strategy would be to adopt
staggered directorships where one-third of the members are elected each
year for a three-year term, with the provision that the shareholders may
remove a director only for cause. This will make it harder for corporate
raiders to gain board representation and start a proxy battle for control.66
Another suggestion, in the wake of Van Gorkom and recent decisions of
state courts indicating the minimum time that a board should spend
making a major business decision in order to enjoy the protection of the
business judgment rule, would be the careful creation of a record of all
deliberations in the decision. The record should reveal whether the board
has reviewed the intrinsic factors of the decisions; whether there is any
62 Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 41, at 244.
6 Verespej, supra note 20, at 16.
Verespej, supra note 2, at 50.
65 Dudley, supra note 1, at 74.
66 Id.
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indication of favoritism or self-dealing of some kind affecting the deci-
sion; and whether any documentation can be produced to demonstrate
that the decision of the board was informed. The best way to avoid
liability to corporate officials is to plan for its possibility and have a
record which indicates that the decision was within the proper bound-
aries of their fiduciary duties and thereby avoid exposure.
Conclusion
Though the planning considerations suggested above afford corporate
directors and officers a degree of protection during the insurance crisis,
none of them provide the full scope of protection afforded by commercial
insurance. The need for director and officer insurance arises from the
gaps in these items. For example, in most situations where statutes limit
or eliminate director liability, the same situations permit indemnifica-
tion by the corporation. In situations where the director will be exposed
to monetary damages, the corporation may be statutorily prohibited from
providing indemnification. Where corporations have attempted to extend
the director's right to indemnification through the use of nonexclusivity
provisions, courts will tend to narrowly interpret the provisions and limit
their scope of protection, especially in derivative actions where indemni-
fication would be circular.
What may be ascertained from this writing is that director and officer
liability insurance still plays an important role in the corporate environ-
ment. Now that the insurance market has begun to settle, the risk factor
in insuring corporate officials may be reduced through the careful
employment of the considerations set forth above, allowing for the
increased availability of corporate directors and officers insurance. The
corporate and legislative responses that arose from the insurance crisis
should provide the needed buffer zone for the insurance industry to
realign itself with the market and re-enter it so as to afford corporate
directors and officers protection in the American corporate atmosphere.
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